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Summary
Senator John Kerry has proposed a major 
overhaul  in  corporate  taxation,  with  the 
goal  of  persuading  multinational  compa-
nies  (MNCs)  to  employ  more  workers  at 
home and fewer abroad. Kerry has correct-
ly emphasized that domestic production is 
often taxed at a higher rate than produc-
tion abroad, but his prescriptions will not 
boost US jobs. 
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The  core  features  of  the  Kerry  plan 
are to cut the US corporate tax rate from 
35 to 33.25 percent and to limit deferred 
US taxation of foreign subsidiaries of US-
based MNCs. In addition, Kerry would of-
fer a short tax holiday for MNCs to repatri-
ate their accumulated foreign earnings at 
a special rate of 10 percent; the revenue 
would be allocated to fund a New Jobs Tax 
Credit. 
Rewriting the US tax code to limit de-
ferred taxation of foreign earnings would 
prompt a series of responses by US-based 
MNCs. Relocating production in the United 
States—Senator  Kerry’s  goal—is  unlikely 
to be the central response. Instead, MNCs 
would explore alternative ways to avoid the 
higher US tax burden and might well sell 
their  operations  abroad  to  foreign-based 
MNCs.  Senator  Kerry’s  plan  could  even 
spark  “corporate  offshoring”—reincorpo-
rating the parent firm outside the United 
States  in  order  to  completely  avoid  US 
taxation of non-US operations.  
Under Kerry’s plan, moreover, foreign-
based  MNCs  would  gain  further  tax  ad-
vantages over US companies in worldwide 
markets—giving  them  a  leg  up  in  future 
expansion.  Experience  shows  that  when 
US-based MNCs expand abroad, they also 
add jobs at home. If foreign-based MNCs 
have a leg up, this source of US employ-
ment  gains  would  be  discouraged,  con-
trary to Kerry’s objectives.  
Our analysis suggests that limiting de-
ferral as Senator Kerry has proposed would 
raise a maximum of $6 billion annually. 
Since his proposed cut in the US corporate 
rate (from 35 to 33.25 percent) would cost 
approximately  $12  billion  annually,  the 
plan would be significantly underfunded.   1 In tax parlance, foreign subsidiaries are known as controlled 
foreign corporations (CFCs) when the US parent firm controls, 
directly and indirectly, more than 50 percent of voting shares 
or, alternatively, holds more than 50 percent of the total value 
of voting shares.
In 1962, Subpart F was added to the Internal Revenue 
Code to end deferral for “passive” CFC income (such as interest, 
dividends, and royalties) when lodged in “tax-haven” countries 
(e.g., Bermuda, Netherlands Antilles, and the Cayman Islands). 
Since its enactment, Subpart F has been progressively expand-
ed (especially with respect to the definition of passive income) 
and is now exceedingly complex. The Kerry plan would extend 
Subpart F to all CFC profits, except those earned by produc-
tion and sale within the CFC’s own country. For the history of 
deferral and other US international tax concepts, see Hufbauer 
(1992). Almost 30 years ago, C. Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst, 
and Theodore Moran (1978, chapter 6) advocated the elimi-
nation of deferral, but at the same time they endorsed other 
changes that would benefit US-based MNCs. In 1978, when 
Bergsten and his colleagues authored their volume, US-based 
MNCs dominated worldwide foreign investment; of course, this 
is no longer true. 
2 This statement is a rough characterization of the very com-
plicated US system of taxing foreign income. For example, due 
to artificial interest allocation rules, the United States some-
times collects a residual tax even when foreign taxes exceed 35 
percent of earnings and profits (E&P) measured under US tax 
accounting standards.
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Likewise, the tax holiday on accumulated earnings 
would not raise anything like the $22 billion men-
tioned by a Kerry aide as the amount committed to 
the proposed New Jobs Tax Credit over a two-year 
period.  
Alternative  changes  in  US  business  taxation 
policies would better address the tax tilt that now 
favors  investment  and  production  abroad.  Under 
current WTO rules, US exporters must pay on im-
porting nations’ value added tax (VAT), but foreign 
exporters  selling  in  the  US  market  are  exempted 
from  their  home-country  VAT.  WTO  rules  do  not 
permit the United States to levy its corporate in-
come  tax  on  imports  nor  to  exempt  its  corporate 
tax on exports. Correcting this archaic distinction 
between indirect and direct taxes—by reforming the 
WTO  rules  that  allow  border  tax  adjustments  for 
indirect taxes but prohibit them for direct taxes, a 
distinction that most tax experts no longer view as 
compelling—would  significantly  promote  US  pro-
duction and jobs.  
If the WTO rules were reformed, one of two out-
comes  would  result.  Either  foreign  governments 
would  no  longer  be  permitted  to  use  border  tax 
adjustments to encourage exports and discourage 
imports or the US government could impose its cor-
porate tax on imports and exempt its exports from 
corporate tax. Either outcome would level the tilt 
in international taxation as it affects sales of goods 
and services in the US market. This would be a far 
superior response to Senator Kerry’s core concern 
than his own tax proposals. Moreover, WTO reform 
would redress the root grievance underlying the 30-
year tax war between the United States and Europe 
over the Domestic International Sales Corporation 
(DISC) and the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC).
Introduction
On March 26, 2004, Senator Kerry proposed a ma-
jor overhaul in the taxation of US corporations doing 
business at home and abroad (Kerry 2004). Kerry’s 
proposed reforms are intended to make the United 
States  a  more  competitive  business  location  and 
to deter both blue-collar and white-collar offshore 
outsourcing  by  US  MNCs.  Our  analysis  indicates 
that the proposed reforms would do more to ben-
efit foreign-based MNCs than to prompt US-based 
MNCs to relocate operations in the United States. 
Moreover,  Senator  Kerry’s  revenue  estimates  are 
overoptimistic: The funds raised would fall far short 
of the amounts required to fund his proposed corpo-
rate tax rate cut and his New Jobs Tax Credit. 
The Kerry Plan
The Kerry plan is designed to be revenue-neutral, 
reducing corporate taxes on operations at home by 
increasing the corporate tax burden on operations 
abroad. It has six key features: 
•  The  Kerry  plan  would  significantly  limit  “defer-
ral”—the tax practice whereby profits that foreign 
subsidiaries (also known as controlled foreign cor-
porations, or CFCs) earn are not taxed until repatri-
ated as dividends to the US parent company.1
• Deferral would, however, still be permitted for CFC 
income that was earned by producing and selling in 
the country where the CFC is based.
• The foreign tax credit would still be allowed for for-
eign corporate and withholding taxes paid on CFC 
profits and dividends. Consequently, the US Trea-
sury would collect additional tax revenue only on 
nondeferred profits earned in countries where the 
combined corporate and withholding tax rate was 
less than the US effective corporate rate (currently a 
35 percent statutory rate but usually a lower effec-
tive rate).2 Kerry estimates that annual US revenue 
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• The additional revenue would be used to reduce 
the  US  corporate  tax  rate  from  35  to  33.25  per-
cent.3 
• Further, the Kerry plan would give MNCs a one-
year tax holiday to repatriate past CFC earnings by 
paying a special toll tax of 10 percent, provided the 
funds are reinvested in the United States and pro-
vided the repatriations are in excess of a base period 
amount. Senator Kerry did not estimate the amount 
of toll tax revenue.
• However, revenue from the special toll tax would 
be used to fund a New Jobs Tax Credit. The new 
credit  would  be  calculated  as  the  employer’s  in-
crease in payroll tax costs on account of hiring ad-
ditional workers. It would be available only to firms 
in “manufacturing and other industries affected by 
outsourcing,” as determined by the secretary of the 
treasury. 
In presenting his plan, Senator Kerry emphasized 
that  US  firms  often  pay  higher  corporate  taxes 
than their competitors abroad—competitors based 
not only in current and emerging industrial pow-
ers  such  as  the  United  Kingdom,  France,  China, 
India, Malaysia, Korea, Brazil, and Mexico but also 
in smaller low-tax countries such as Ireland, Singa-
pore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.4 Kerry also empha-
sized that some MNCs engage in tax abuse, through 
“corporate  inversions”  (moving  their  headquarters 
to tax-haven countries such as Bermuda), “hybrid 
structures” (partnerships in the eyes of one coun-
try, corporations in the eyes of another), and “cross-
crediting” (using the foreign tax credit on dividends 
from high-tax country A to shield dividends from 
low-tax country B against US taxation).5
The location and abuse problems that have cap-
tured Senator Kerry’s attention are a consequence 
of  differences  in  national  corporate  tax  practices 
in an open world economy. Firms are not only free 
to produce in one location and sell in another but 
also have some latitude to choose where profits are 
booked.  Tax  considerations  do  not  control  most 
business decisions on where to produce and do not 
determine where most profits are booked. But taxes 
do have influence at the margin. Other things be-
ing equal, an MNC will prefer to produce in country 
A with a low tax rate rather than country B with a 
high tax rate. Likewise, an MNC may consider tax 
stratagems  (such  as  hybrid  structures,  corporate 
inversions, and artificial transfer pricing) that en-
able  it  to  book  profits  in  country  A  rather  than 
country B.6
Right Diagnosis
Senator  Kerry’s  diagnosis—that  the  US  corporate 
tax system disadvantages firms that produce in the 
United  States—is  basically  correct.  Moreover,  US 
corporate tax rates are sufficiently high that some 
MNCs  may  be  tempted  to  deploy  strategies  that 
book profits in low-tax jurisdictions.
Table  1  shows  that  the  average  effective  for-
eign corporate tax rates actually paid by CFCs are 
considerably lower in a number of countries than 
the average effective (federal plus state) corporate 
tax rate paid in the United States. This is true not 
only of low-tax countries such as Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Ireland and tax-haven countries such as 
Bermuda, Netherlands Antilles, and the Cayman Is-
lands but also of major industrial competitors such 
as  France,  the  United  Kingdom,  China,  Taiwan, 
Mexico, and Brazil.
Senator Kerry’s proposed reforms would 
do more to benefit foreign-based MNCs 
than to prompt US-based MNCs to relocate 
operations in the United States.
3 These are federal statutory rates; the effective rate (federal 
and state) is currently 30.1 percent. According to GAO (2004), 
the majority of corporations operating in the United States 
report no federal tax liability at all. In 2000, 38 percent of large 
foreign-controlled corporations and 45 percent of large US-con-
trolled corporations reported no tax liability. (Large corporations 
are defined as those with assets of at least $250 million or gross 
receipts of at least $50 million.)  Some 63 percent of all US-con-
trolled corporations (large and small) reported no tax liability in 
2000.
4 We define low-tax countries as those with average effective 
corporate rates of 20 percent or less.
5 Most tax practitioners do not regard “cross-crediting” as an 
abuse. Cross-crediting is a feature of the overall, as opposed to 
the per-country, limit on the foreign tax credit (Hufbauer 1992). 
In 1978, Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978, chapter 6) joined 
other commentators in recommending a per-country rather 
than an overall limit on the foreign tax credit. The basic argu-
ment is that, from the standpoint of tax neutrality, it doesn’t 
make sense to shelter production (and profits) in low-tax coun-
try B from US corporate taxation by way of foreign tax credits 
derived from production (and profits) in high-tax country A.
6 Artificial transfer pricing occurs when the price charged (or 
costs allocated) between related members of an MNC group 
differ from what independent companies would charge (or al-
locate). Detailed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations 
attempt to curtail artificial transfer pricing, but their success is 
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Asia and the Pacific          
Japanc 417  60  66  48.2 57.0
India 50  26  4  32.2 35.0
Korea 161  44  12  30.1 34.0
Australia 65  129  36  21.8 36.0
Thailand 69  30  7  15.2 30.0
Taiwand 144  33  10  13.7 25.0
China (Hong Kong) 200  433  36  13.4 16.0
China (Mainland) 326  448  10  11.3 33.4
Malaysia 93  57  9  8.2 28.0
Indonesia 57  56  8  0.2 28.5
Subtotal 1,583  1,315  197     
Europe          
Italy 251  126  28  40.9 41.3
Germany 604  452  65  30.5 60.0
France 331  401   44  22.7 39.3
United Kingdom 276  639  255  18.2 30.0
Netherlands 243  315  145  14.2 35.0
Subtotal 1,706  1,933  538     
Western Hemisphere          
United Statese 693  1,351  n.a.  30.1 40.0
Canada 252  221  153  28.2 40.1
Brazil 60  236  32  16.6 32.0
Mexico 161  154  58  15.1 35.0
Argentina 26  77  11  13.6 35.0
Subtotal 1,192  2,039  254     
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Small, low-tax          
Bermudaf 1  78  69  11.6 0
Switzerland 87  118  70  10.3 31.0
Chile 18  46  12  10.0 35.0
Singapore 125  124  61  10.0 26.0
Irelandg 88  157  42  8.5 32.0
Panamac,h 1  7  20  7.0 30.0
Netherlands Antillesi 2  0  n.a.  5.7 50.0
Costa Rica 10  6  2  0.9 30.0
Subtotal 332  538  275     
Total listed 4,813  5,824  1,264     
World total 6,419  7,123  1,521     
(continued)
n.a. = not applicable
a. Based on PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) and on 1998 US profits tax liability (federal and state) as reported in US Census 
Bureau (2003).
b. Based on data from PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999). 
c. Statistical discrepancy between FDI data sources.
d. Taiwan is not a member of the IMF; export data is from national agency.
e. For the United States, the federal statutory rate is 35 percent and the average state statutory rate is assumed to be 5 percent.
f. Statistical discrepancy in tax collected, possibly a result of indirect taxation by third country.
g. Inward investment to Ireland in manufacturing and some services may be eligible for a 10 or 12.5 percent statutory rate.
h. Income derived from sales in the Colon Free Zone to foreign countries is not taxed.  
i. BEA does not separately report FDI position in the Netherlands Antilles. Offshore investment, holding, and finance companies are 
subject to a 3 percent statutory rate.
Sources: IMF (2004) for export data; UNCTAD (2003) for total FDI stock; BEA (2004) for US FDI stock; PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2003) for effective tax rates in foreign countries; PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999) for statutory tax rates; and US Census Bureau 
(2003) for effective tax rate in the United States. Number PB04-3 April 2004 6
Relative Tax Rates, Then and Now 
In  the  1980s,  after  the  Reagan-era  tax  cuts,  the 
US corporate tax rate was lower than most of its 
industrial competitors—primarily Canada, Europe, 
and Japan. Since then, many OECD countries have 
slashed  their  corporate  tax  rates  and  introduced 
incentives such as rapid depreciation. Meanwhile, 
new  industrial  competitors  have  emerged—China, 
Korea, India, Mexico, Brazil, and others. While the 
new competitors may have high statutory tax rates, 
their  effective  rates  are  much  lower,  through  the 
process  of  tax  holidays  and  lenient  enforcement 
(table 1).7
The  upshot,  after  two  decades,  is  that  the 
United States has become relatively less attractive 
from a tax standpoint than in the mid-1980s and 
early 1990s. In his analysis of 59 countries, John 
Mutti (2003, table 2.4) found that in 1984–92, 20 
of them had lower effective corporate rates than the 
United States and 39 had higher rates. However, 
by 1992–96, 43 had lower effective rates than the 
United States and only 16 had higher rates.
Archaic Border Tax Adjustment Rules 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) rules for bor-
der tax adjustments further disadvantage US firms. 
Border  tax  adjustments  occur  when  a  tax  is  im-
posed on imports but is not assessed (or is rebated) 
on exports. For example, when a US firm exports 
goods to the European Union, it may be hit with a 
20 percent value added tax (VAT). However, when 
the EU firm exports to the United States, it gets a 
rebate on the 20 percent VAT and at most pays a 
small state sales tax. 
The  idea  behind  border  tax  adjustments  is 
to impose the tax in question on final purchases 
in  the  country  imposing  the  tax.  However,  under 
WTO  rules,  recently  interpreted  by  the  Appellate 
Body in the FSC case, direct business taxes (such 
as  the  corporate  income  tax)  cannot  be  adjusted 
at  the  border,  but  indirect  business  taxes  (such 
as VAT) can be.8 With the exception of the United 
States,  most  countries  rely  heavily  on  indirect 
business  taxes  for  government  revenue.9   Under 
WTO  rules,  therefore,  US  firms  incur  these  taxes 
when they sell into Europe, Canada, Latin Amer-
ica,  and  most  other  countries;  meanwhile  their 
competitors sell into the US market virtually free 
of tax. 
The WTO distinction between direct and indirect 
taxes is based on a false premise: the assumption 
that the economic burden of the VAT falls totally 
and uniformly on the purchasers of goods and ser-
vices (like an excise tax on whiskey), whereas the 
economic burden of US corporate income tax falls 
totally and uniformly on the producers of goods and 
services (like a tax on real estate). The analogy be-
tween the VAT and a tax on whiskey is misplaced.   
The VAT is nothing more than the sum of two direct 
taxes: a tax on labor value added and a tax on capi-
tal value added. In the absence of tax adjustments 
at the border, the economic burden of both the cor-
porate income tax and the VAT tax falls primarily on 
the labor and capital that produce goods and ser-
vices. There is no reason in principle for WTO rules 
to discriminate between them.
In  practice,  the  archaic  rules  mean  that  US 
firms  must  pay  high  VAT  taxes  on  their  exports, 
while  their  foreign  competitors  can  sell  into  the 
US market largely free of tax obligations, both at 
home and in the United States. As the US-EU dis-
pute over the FSC and Senator Kerry’s campaign 
promises have shown, Washington politics is highly 
7 In 1998, the average effective tax rate on CFCs doing busi-
ness in India was 32 percent (table 1). However, because of tax 
holidays and special incentives, Indian call centers and software 
programming firms usually pay much lower effective rates 
today.
8 See WTO case number WT/DS108, titled United States—Tax 
Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations. See also Hufbauer 
(2002) for a detailed analysis of the FSC saga.
9 For example, indirect taxes on goods and services comprise 
30 percent of total taxes in the European Union but only 16 
percent in the United States (OECD 2003, table 25).
Senator Kerry’s revenue estimates are 
overoptimistic: The funds raised would fall 
far short of the amounts required to fund 
his proposed corporate tax rate cut and his 
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sensitive to the role that tax differences might play 
in shifting jobs abroad, whether or not sophisticated 
economic analysis demonstrates that jobs are actu-
ally shifted.10
Exchange Rate Salvation? 
The classic answer to national differences in corpo-
rate tax rates, and the archaic distinction between 
direct and indirect business taxes, is that exchange 
rate  adjustments  will  eventually  offset  tax  differ-
ences  and  wash  away  any  permanent  effect  on 
business location decisions. Even if the exchange 
rate answer is correct as a long-run proposition, it 
evokes John Maynard Keynes’s famous aphorism: 
“In the long run, we are all dead.”11
In the here and now, moreover, exchange rate 
adjustments  have  certainly  not  been  effective  in 
curtailing US trade deficits. For almost a decade, a 
persistently strong and even overvalued dollar has 
led to large and increasing trade deficits, to the point 
where the figure now exceeds $500 billion annually, 
about 5 percent of GDP. With this experience, it is 
much harder to trot out an exchange rate answer to 
national tax differences.
Summarizing the Diagnosis 
Senator Kerry has correctly identified two problems. 
Under the current tax regime, profits earned abroad 
are often taxed less heavily than those earned at 
home,  so  that  US  firms  have  incentive  to  invest 
abroad  rather  than  at  home.  Since  effective  US 
corporate tax rates are higher than those of many 
other countries, business investment in the United 
States is discouraged. Moreover, WTO rules enable 
foreign VAT taxes to be imposed on US exports and 
excused on US imports. In the long run, exchange 
rate adjustments may wash out all these tax differ-
ences, but over the past decade, exchange rate relief 
has been invisible to US firms. 
But Wrong Prescription
Senator  Kerry’s  prescription  has  two  main  parts: 
lower  the  US  corporate  tax  rate  on  operations  at 
home  and  raise  US  corporate  taxes—by  limiting 
deferral—on operations abroad. In addition, Kerry 
would provide a special tax holiday for the repatria-
tion of past earnings.
Senator Kerry’s proposal to reduce the US fed-
eral corporate tax rate from 35 to 33.25 percent is 
commendable for improving the international com-
petitiveness of the United States (in the context of 
a revenue neutral plan), even though it would only 
modestly narrow the gap between US and foreign 
tax rates (table 1). 
However,  Senator  Kerry’s  prescription  to  level 
the tax field by ending deferral is wrong, for three 
important reasons. First, it unduly punishes MNCs 
for sluggish job growth in the United States. Sec-
ond,  it  would  encourage  tax-driven  restructuring 
and  outright  divestment  to  a  greater  extent  than 
it would promote relocation in the United States. 
Third,  since  Kerry’s  plan  would  only  affect  US 
multinationals,  it  would  actually  tilt  the  tax  field 
more steeply in favor of foreign MNCs that export 
to the United States and third countries. Addition-
ally, there are serious questions whether the Kerry 
plan  would  actually  raise  the  amount  of  revenue 
advertised.
MNCs and US Jobs 
MNCs are frequently criticized for shifting US jobs 
overseas—or in the words of Lou Dobbs, “export-
ing America.” Such assertions rely on anecdotes of 
employment growth overseas and contraction in the 
United States, whether or not there is a causal link 
between the two and whether or not taxes are the 
driver. For example, Jonathan Weisman, reporting 
Senator Kerry’s proposal to reduce the 
US federal corporate tax rate from 35 to 
33.25 percent is commendable, but given 
the fiscal realities of the federal budget, it 
is most unlikely that the gap between US 
and foreign effective corporate tax rates 
can be eliminated simply by cutting the US 
corporate rate.
10 In a recent paper, Mihir Desai and James Hines (2002) 
examined panel data from 168 countries over 1950–2000 and 
found—after allowing for several control variables—that the 
countries using VAT systems actually have fewer exports. In 
2000, evidence from 136 countries indicated that a 10 percent 
increase in VAT revenue is associated with a 2 percent decrease 
in exports. The authors speculate that the tendency of countries 
to both levy higher VAT rates on traded than nontraded goods 
and underrebate input taxes when goods are exported may ex-
plain these findings. Whatever the explanation for the results of 
Desai and Hines, the findings give little comfort to US firms.
11 Moreover, adverse network and scale economy effects may 
result in the loss of industries that subsequent exchange rate 
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in the Washington Post, observed that Merck shed 
3,200 US jobs in 2003 while adding 1,300 foreign 
jobs and booked an additional $3 billion of deferred 
foreign earnings.12
In some cases, links surely exist between jobs at 
home, jobs abroad, and taxes. However, systematic 
studies indicate that expanded MNC activity abroad, 
on balance, creates jobs in the United States. In a 
recent  report,  Matthew  Slaughter  (2004)  presents 
some revealing statistics. Between 1991 and 2001, 
CFCs  increased  the  number  of  foreign  employees 
from 6.9 million to 9.8 million, a gain of 2.9 mil-
lion  workers.  Meanwhile,  their  US  parent  firms 
increased the number of US employees from 18 mil-
lion to 23.5 million, a gain of 5.5 million workers. 
The rate of job expansion abroad was faster than at 
home. Even so, the US parent firms increased their 
share of total US employment by 1.2 percent (from 
16.6 to 17.8 percent). On balance, these statistics 
do not suggest that MNCs by and large have a re-
cord of shifting jobs abroad. Further, in a detailed 
econometric analysis of US employment experience, 
Slaughter and his colleagues show that expansion 
abroad is not the enemy of employment at home 
(Hanson,  Mataloni,  and  Slaughter  2003).13  More-
over, econometric analysis by Edward M. Graham 
(2000,  appendix  B),  among  others,  demonstrates 
that foreign investment by MNCs tends to attract 
(not replace) US exports of goods and services. As a 
generalization, the perennial complaint that MNCs 
“export jobs” is simply wrong.
Unhelpful Outcomes 
The second reason Senator Kerry’s prescription is 
misguided  involves  the  mechanics  of  his  plan.  If 
deferral is ended (except for in-country CFC sales), 
and if the additional tax bite is substantial, MNCs 
will consider four alternatives: 
• First, as Senator Kerry hopes, some MNCs may 
relocate  their  production  activities  in  the  United 
States  or  at  least  choose  US  rather  than  foreign 
sites for future expansion.14
• Second, they may turn to their tax lawyers and 
accountants to create new structures for distribut-
ing out-of-country CFC sales. As just one example, 
they might sell their entire output to foreign-owned 
wholesale  firms  in  the  host  country.  Those  firms 
would then handle the distribution to other coun-
tries,  including  the  United  States.  That  way,  the 
CFC’s  entire  earnings  would  count  as  in-country 
profits,  still  eligible  for  deferral.  Alternatively,  the 
CFC might price its out-of-country sales to related 
firms at bargain basement prices and claim that the 
bulk  of  its  earnings  was  derived  from  in-country 
sales.15  If  all  other  avenues  were  closed  off,  then 
“corporate inversion” would represent the nuclear 
option. By moving corporate headquarters overseas, 
former US parent firms could entirely escape the US 
tax net for their non-US operations. Senator Kerry’s 
plan could inadvertently spur “corporate offshoring” 
on a grand scale.16
•  Third,  if  detailed  tracing  rules,  transfer  pricing 
rules,  anti-inversion  taxes,  and  other  regulations 
prevented  the  sort  of  response  considered  in  the 
second  alternative,  the  MNC  might  simply  sell  a 
majority of its CFC shares to a foreign partner. Once 
non-US parties own 51 percent of the foreign sub-
sidiary, it ceases to be a CFC (no more US control) 
and thus escapes the US tax net.17 Alternatively, the 
MNC might just sell out entirely to a foreign com-
12 See “US Firms Keep Billions Overseas, Kerry Plan Spotlights 
Huge Untaxed Earnings,” Washington Post, April 2, 2004, A1.
13 On the connection between jobs and FDI, also see Lipsey, 
Ramsterrer, and Blomstrom (2000).
14 From the US national standpoint, this seems like the best 
possible outcome. However, if relocation in the United States 
entails higher costs, even this outcome has its disadvantages. 
The affected MNCs will have fewer funds to carry out research 
and development, capital investment, and other expansion ac-
tivities that would otherwise generate additional US 
employment.
15 If Senator Kerry’s plan were reduced to legislative language, 
antiabuse provisions would attempt to eliminate deferral when 
the CFC sold to a third party in the expectation of out-of-coun-
try sales. Likewise, the transfer pricing rules would be invoked 
against bargain sales. However, in practice, it seems doubtful 
that the IRS could keep up with the ingenuity of private lawyers 
and accountants.
16 For a discussion of the corporate inversions hotly debated in 
2002, see Hufbauer and Assa (2003). Unlike the tax incentives 
that inspired Stanley Works and Tyco International to engage in 
“paper” inversions, the Kerry plan might prompt “real” inver-
sions, with the actual movement of headquarters personnel to 
foreign locations. Tax practitioners would certainly suggest that 
newly formed companies incorporate and locate their headquar-
ters abroad, so as to stay clear of the US tax net.
17 In 1986, after the United States repealed deferral for shipping 
income, several US firms sold a majority interest in their ship-
ping CFCs. 
Senator Kerry’s plan for limiting deferral 
could inadvertently spur “corporate 
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petitor. After all, if an MNC’s production in Ireland 
is going to be taxed at the US average effective rate 
of about 30 percent (table 1), while a competing for-
eign firm can produce the same product and pay 
the Irish effective rate of only 8.5 percent, the MNC 
may not be able to stay in game. The US-based MNC 
might decide to sell out and withdraw from the busi-
ness. 
•  Fourth,  MNCs  might  decide  to  absorb  the  in-
creased  tax  costs  (an  increase  that  their  foreign-
based competitors do not bear) by raising prices, ac-
cepting lower after-tax profits, or both. If they raise 
prices, they will lose global market share. If they ac-
cept lower profits, the market value of their shares 
will decline, harming pension funds, employee stock 
ownership plans, and individual shareholders. 
Our guess is that the second, third, and fourth al-
ternatives would dominate MNC responses rather 
than a decision to relocate production to the United 
States. 
Damage to US Competitive Position 
The second, third, and fourth alternatives are not 
the responses Senator Kerry has in mind. None of 
them  would  benefit  US  workers  or  shareholders. 
All  would  damage  the  US  competitive  position  in 
world  markets.  Tax-driven  restructuring  (the  sec-
ond approach) would entail legal, accounting, and 
transaction  costs.  Genuine  divestment  (the  third 
approach) would deprive the United States of as-
sociated exports (both components and final goods) 
now sold through CFCs. It would deprive the US 
parent firm of a profitable stream of royalty, inter-
est, and dividend income. The research findings of 
Hanson,  Mataloni,  and  Slaughter  (2003)  suggest 
that divestment would probably dampen the rate of 
US employment growth by US parent firms. Finally, 
if  MNCs  simply  absorbed  the  increased  tax  costs 
(the fourth approach), then they would be placed at 
a competitive disadvantage compared with foreign-
based  peers.18  The  disadvantage  would  show  up 
either in prices charged in world markets or in the 
MNCs’ equity valuations. 
A Boon to Foreign Multinationals? 
Senator Kerry intends to discourage both blue-col-
lar  and  white-collar  offshore  outsourcing  by  US 
multinational companies. However, ending deferral 
will do nothing to discourage the US importation of 
software  programs  from  India  or  semiconductors 
from  China  when  the  exporter  is  a  foreign-owned 
company. IBM and Texas Instruments may be dis-
couraged from producing in India or China and sell-
ing in the United States or third-country markets, 
but SAP of Germany and Toshiba of Japan will not 
be.19  The  SAP  and  Toshiba  corporate  groups  are 
organized around parent firms based, respectively, 
in Germany and Japan. Hence their foreign subsid-
iaries are not controlled by US persons and conse-
quently are not CFCs from the standpoint of US tax 
jurisdiction. 
As table 1 shows, US MNCs are far from alone in 
the world. In fact, they account for only one-fourth 
of world foreign direct investment (FDI) in countries 
other than the United States. Plenty of competitors 
are willing and able to take their place if, for tax rea-
sons, US-based MNCs are no longer able to compet-
itively produce goods and services abroad for sale in 
the United States or third-country markets. 
Realistic Revenue Estimate? 
Senator  Kerry  has  estimated  that  ending  deferral 
would generate about $12 billion of additional US 
tax revenue annually. How reasonable is this esti-
mate? The undistributed earnings and profits (E&P) 
of CFCs based in low-tax countries increased from 
$180 billion in December 1998 to around $340 bil-
lion in December 2003.20 The annual E&P increase 
was thus about $32 billion. The average effective 
Our estimate of a $5 billion revenue gain 
from the tax holiday is highly speculative; a 
$22 billion revenue gain—as mentioned by 
a Kerry aide—is almost inconceivable.
18 Even if they relocate production in the United States, US-
based MNCs may incur a competitive disadvantage, since costs 
(including taxes) are almost certainly higher than in the alterna-
tive foreign location.
19 Of course, IBM and Texas Instruments would still make 
extensive sales in the US market based on production in the 
United States and other high-tax locations.
20 The Kerry plan cites the Congressional Research Service for 
an estimate that CFCs had $639 billion of retained E&P in De-
cember 2002. However, about half of this E&P was retained in 
CFCs based in countries where the combination of corporate tax 
and withholding tax on repatriations would substantially offset 
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foreign tax rate (both corporate profit and withhold-
ing taxes) on these earnings is about 11 percent. 
Since  the  US  effective  rate  is  30  percent,  these 
figures  suggest  that  ending  deferral  would  gener-
ate additional US tax of about 19 percent (after the 
foreign tax credit), or about $6 billion. The Kerry 
plan might generate additional revenue from undis-
tributed E&P of CFCs based in other countries, but 
it’s very hard to see another $6 billion—the amount 
necessary to reach a total annual revenue gain of 
$12 billion.21
There  are  collateral  reasons  for  thinking  that 
the $12 billion figure is high. The Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation (JCT)—a House-Senate committee 
charged with estimating the revenue effects of tax 
legislation—has estimated that ending deferral for 
all  CFCs  on  all  their  operations  would  only  yield 
$6.9 billion of additional revenue in 2005.22 How-
ever, Kerry’s plan will allow companies “to defer the 
income they earn when they locate production in 
a foreign country that serves that country’s foreign 
market.” This means that the change will not affect 
the majority of CFC sales (especially in mid-sized 
and  large  countries),  since  host-country  markets 
account for 65 percent of total affiliate sales.23 Of 
the sales that would lose deferral, most are exports 
to  third  countries  (some  24  percent  of  total  CFC 
sales are exports to third countries, while only 11 
percent is destined for the United States).24 Taking 
these caveats into account, we think that $6 billion 
represents the top end of annual revenue that might 
be generated from Kerry’s plan to limit deferral. 
Spending the Revenue 
The $12 billion (Kerry’s estimate) raised from limit-
ing deferral is intended to pay for a cut in the federal 
corporate income tax rate from 35 to 33.25 percent. 
According to the Economic Report of the President, 
federal  corporate  income  taxes  are  projected  to 
reach $230 billion in 2005 (CEA 2004, table B-80). 
A cut in the rate by 1.75 percentage points (5 per-
cent of the base level) works out to $11.5 billion. 
That part of Kerry’s arithmetic is correct. However, 
if limiting deferral does not generate more than $6 
billion annually (our top estimate), then the corpo-
rate tax rate cut would be seriously underfunded.
Tax Holiday and Job Credit 
The Kerry plan has a second component, with no 
revenue estimate. It provides a tax holiday for repa-
triated prior year CFC earnings, above a base level 
of repatriations, with a toll tax of 10 percent. The 
money raised would be spent on a New Jobs Tax 
Credit to help industries adversely affected by out-
sourcing.25
Any Revenue? 
As proposed, the tax holiday is not likely to generate 
much revenue. Based on recent experience, US par-
ent firms pay an average US tax of less than 4 per-
cent on repatriated dividends from their CFCs (see, 
for example, Altshuler and Grubert 2003). Since the 
decision to repatriate is elective, both under present 
law and the Kerry plan, it is not clear why US parent 
firms would suddenly decide to repatriate additional 
funds and pay a 10 percent toll tax, when they have 
customarily  paid  less  than  4  percent.26  Although 
Kerry  has  not  proposed  it, one  possible  incentive 
would be the retroactive elimination of deferral on 
past CFC earnings and profits, to the extent the US 
parent did not elect the special tax holiday. To be as 
As a matter of urgency, the United States 
should demand an end to the archaic WTO 
distinction between direct and indirect 
business taxation.
21 Undistributed E&P from CFCs, other than those based in low-
tax countries, amounts to about $47 billion annually. However, 
the combination of foreign corporate tax and withholding tax on 
these earnings would very likely reduce US corporate tax to 5 
percent or less of that portion derived from out-of-country sales. 
Since out-of-country operations are about 35 percent of total 
sales, the implied US revenue from ending deferral on this E&P 
might be less than $1 billion annually.
22 This is the tax expenditure estimate for “deferral of active in-
come of controlled foreign corporations” and “deferral of certain 
active financing income” (JCT 2003, table 1).
23 In 2001, total sales of US affiliates was $2.5 trillion, of which 
$1.6 trillion was to the local country, $272 billion to the United 
States, and $604 billion to third countries (BEA 2003, table 
III.F.1).
24 According to one of Senator Kerry’s aides, the plan would 
eliminate deferral on 75 percent of E&P. This estimate is incon-
sistent with the proposal that in-country sales (65 percent of 
the CFC total) would still be eligible for deferral. See “Kerry Goes 
After Outsourcing with Tax Plan,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 
March 29, 2004, A1.
25 The flavor of tax credits targeted to adversely affected indus-
tries troubles some commentators and editorialists (e.g., “John 
Kerry, Supply-Sider?” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2004, 
A18). They detect a perverse industrial policy for sunset 
industries.
26 Presumably, but unstated in the Kerry plan, no foreign tax 
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Box 1: Revenue Estimate Based on the Homeland Investment Act of 2003
The Homeland Investment Act of 2003 (H.R. 767, 
also known as the HIA), sponsored by Congressman 
Phil English (R-PA), is similar in spirit but different 
in result to the tax holiday component of Senator 
Kerry’s plan.1 The HIA provides, for one year, an 
elective US corporate toll tax at the rate of 5.25 per-
cent (as opposed to 10 percent in the Kerry plan) on 
qualifying dividends repatriated by US parent firms 
from their controlled financial corporations (CFCs). 
Qualifying dividends are those so designated by the 
US parent firm in excess of a base period dividend 
amount. The foreign tax credit on qualifying divi-
dends would be disallowed to the extent of 85 per-
cent (Kerry does not mention the foreign tax credit, 
but we presume he intends total disallowance). 
The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) has 
scored the HIA with a revenue cost of $4.4 billion 
over 10 years, projecting that lower revenues in 
future years will more than offset the tax holiday 
windfall. The minutia of tax scoring is too arcane 
for this policy brief, but we believe that the JCT 
score has the wrong sign and that the HIA should 
be scored with a revenue gain of around $2 billion 
over 10 years. However, a higher toll tax (Kerry’s 10 
percent rather than HIA’s 5.25 percent and total dis-
allowance of the foreign tax credit compared with 85 
percent disallowance) would, in our opinion, dramat-
ically lower the amount of additional repatriations. 
We estimated $200 billion additional repatria-
tions under the HIA.2 Given the less attractive terms 
of the Kerry plan (an effective tax rate more than 
twice as high), we believe it cannot hope to attract 
more than $50 billion. A 10 percent toll tax on $50 
billion of new repatriations (above the base amount) 
would generate an immediate $5 billion of additional 
US revenue in the tax holiday year. Ignoring lower 
revenues in the future, we use this figure as a gener-
ous upper bound on the revenue that the Kerry tax 
holiday might generate.
1 We endorse the HIA. Other bills with the same tax holiday 
spirit include S. 596 (Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconcili-
ation Act of 2003) and H.R. 2896 (American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2003).
2 The $200 billion figure is expressed on a “grossed-up” 
basis and consists of $178 billion of net CFC dividend repa-
triations plus attributed foreign taxes (the so-called gross-
up) of $22 billion. On a grossed-up basis, at the end of 
2003, undistributed earnings and profits in low-tax CFCs 
was about $380 billion. Our estimate for the HIA assumes 
that US parent firms would distribute more than half of 
this amount.
optimistic as possible, we assume that the Kerry tax 
holiday will spur an additional $50 billion of CFC 
repatriations based on the analysis of the Homeland 
Investment Act of 2003 (box 1). We think the extra 
$50 billion would, at most, yield a revenue boost of 
$5 billion. 
New Jobs Tax Credit 
How far would $5 billion go in paying for the New 
Jobs  Tax  Credit—the  employer’s  portion  of  pay-
roll tax for firms in certified industries? In 2001, 
the employer’s portion worked out, on average, to 
$2,100 per employee.27 Arithmetic suggests that $5 
billion would thus cover the payroll tax for about 
2.4 million job years.
By contrast, an aide to Senator Kerry claimed 
(on March 26, 2004) that the New Jobs Tax Credit 
would provide a payroll tax benefit of $22 billion 
over two years.28 We think this figure was reached 
by calculating a payroll tax benefit of $2,200 per 
employee for Senator Kerry’s goal of creating 10 mil-
lion new jobs. Our estimate of a $5 billion revenue 
gain from the tax holiday is highly speculative; a 
$22 billion revenue gain is almost inconceivable. 
Better Prescriptions
Senator  Kerry’s  diagnosis—a  tilted  tax  field—is 
correct but not for the reasons that hold his atten-
tion. Tax differentials are not the main reason for 
offshore outsourcing, nor are they the main reason 
for the trade deficit. However, policy can and should 
address market distortions caused by tax imbalanc-
es. For the reasons summarized in this policy brief, 
Kerry’s prescription is misguided. It is unlikely to 
raise the revenue necessary to finance a cut in the 
corporate tax rate from 35 to 33.25 percent—though 
27 Calculated by authors using data from US Census Bureau 
(2003, table 541).
28 See “Kerry Targets Job Outsourcing with Corporate Tax Over-
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a cut in the US corporate rate would be laudable. 
Limiting deferral would also almost certainly make 
US firms less competitive in world markets.
The solution to the tax tilt lies not in jiggering 
with the taxation of US business abroad, however 
much that speaks to the political mood of the mo-
ment, but in fundamentally changing the taxation 
of US business at home. The day has long passed (if 
it ever existed) when the United States could change 
the way foreign countries structured their tax sys-
tems. But the United States can certainly change 
the way it taxes business at home and how it taxes 
imports and exports of goods and services.
We  have  already  applauded  Senator  Kerry’s 
proposal  to  cut  the  statutory  US  corporate  tax 
rate to 33.25 percent. Any measure that closes the 
gap  between  US  and  foreign  effective  corporate 
tax rates is a step in the right direction. But given 
the fiscal realities of the federal budget, the gap is 
unlikely to be eliminated simply by cutting the US 
corporate rate.
Thus, as a matter of urgency, the United States 
should demand an end to the archaic WTO distinc-
tion between direct and indirect business taxation. 
In the WTO Doha Round of trade negotiations, the 
United States should insist that the WTO rules be 
rewritten to either: 
•  Abolish  border  tax  adjustments  altogether  (on 
both imports and exports), with a limited exception 
for sumptuary excise taxes (“sin taxes”);29 or
• Allow border tax adjustments for direct business 
taxes (exemplified by the corporate income tax) as 
well as indirect business taxes (VAT and its cous-
ins). 
The first outcome would level the tax field to a far 
greater extent than Senator Kerry’s proposals, since 
VAT and similar taxes are much higher, per unit 
of  final  sales,  than  corporate  income  taxes.30  US 
firms would no longer pay foreign VAT on their ex-
ports, and foreign competitors could no longer sell 
into the US market free of their home-country VAT 
obligation.  Since  VAT  rates  are  typically  around 
15  percent  of  final  sales,  the  abolition  of  border 
adjustments  would  substantially  improve  the 
competitive position of US firms, assuming no ex-
change rate offset.31
The  second  outcome  would  pave  the  way  for 
the United States to impose its own corporate tax 
on imported goods and services. Mechanically, this 
could be achieved, in a rough and ready fashion, 
by disallowing a portion of the business deduction 
for goods or services purchased from foreign suppli-
ers.32 Eliminating the WTO distinction between di-
rect and indirect business taxes would also enable 
the United States, if it so decided, to exempt export 
earnings from the corporate tax base. As long as the 
United States runs a trade deficit in the range of 
$500 billion annually, border adjustments (both im-
ports and exports) for corporate income tax would 
generate around $15 billion of tax revenue, enough 
to pay for Senator Kerry’s cut in the US corporate 
tax rate.33
Either solution to the archaic WTO rules would 
go a great deal further to level the international tax 
field than Senator Kerry’s proposals. Moreover, WTO 
reform would redress the root grievance underlying 
three decades of tax wars between the United States 
and Europe.
29 Sin taxes are exemplified by very high taxes on alcohol, to-
bacco, and perfume.
30 When profits are 10 percent of final sales (a high figure for 
most firms), a 30 percent corporate profits tax amounts to 3 
percent of final sales. By comparison, VAT systems typically 
impose tax at rates between 10 and 20 percent of final sales. 
See OECD (2001). 
31 Abolition of border adjustments would, however, require the 
US states to refrain from imposing use taxes on purchases from 
out-of-state suppliers. It would also require the states to collect 
their sales taxes on goods sold out of state. Both changes would 
be contentious.
32 More exact, but administratively much more complex, border 
adjustments could be designed for imported goods and services. 
If WTO rules are rewritten to permit border adjustments for 
direct taxes, the new rules should permit approximate as well 
as exact calculations. 
33 In 2000, gross domestic product originating in the private 
sector amounted to $8,606 billion, and corporate tax liability 
amounted to $259 billion. Roughly, federal corporate taxes 
amount to 3 percent of private-sector value added. Applying 
this figure to a trade deficit of $500 billion indicates that the net 
revenue from border adjustments would be roughly $15 billion.Number PB04-3 April 2004 13
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